Foreign power interference in domestic elections is an age-old, existential threat to societies. Manifested through myriad methods from war to words, such interference is a timely example of strategic interaction between economic and political agents. We model this interaction between rational game players as a continuous-time differential game, constructing an analytical model of this competition with a variety of payoff structures. Structures corresponding to all-or-nothing attitudes regarding the effect of the interference operations by only one player lead to an arms race in which both countries spend increasing amounts on interference and counter-interference operations. We then confont our model with data pertaining to the Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election contest, introducing and estimating a Bayesian structural time series model of election polls and social media posts by Russian internet trolls. We show that our analytical model, while purposefully abstract and simple, adequately captures many temporal characteristics of the election and social media activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In democratic and nominally-democratic countries, elections are societally and politically crucial events in which power is allocated [1] . In fully-democratic countries elections are the method of legitimate governmental change [2] . One country, whom we will label "Red", may wish to influence or appear to influence the outcome of an election in another country, whom we will label "Blue", because of the importance or perceived importance of elections in Blue with respect to Red's interests. Such attacks on democracies are not new; it is estimated that the United States (U.S.) and Russia or its predecessor, the Soviet Union, often interfere in the elections of other nations and have consistently done this since 1946 [3] . Though academic study of this area has increased [4, 5] , we are unaware of much formal modeling of noncooperative dynamics in an election interference game.
Here, we consider a Red -Blue two-player game in which Red wishes to influence a two-candidate, zero-sum election taking place in Blue's country, as outlined above. In this context, we think of Red and Blue as the respective foreign (Red) and domestic (Blue) intelligence services of the two countries. Red wants a particular candidate (candidate A) to win the election, while Blue wants the effect of Red's interference to be minimized. We characterize this problem theoretically, deriving a noncooperative, non-zero-sum differential game, and then explore the game numerically. We find that all-or-nothing attitudes by either Red or Blue can lead to arms-race conditions in interference operations. In the event that one party credibly commits to playing a particular strategy, we derive further analytical results.
Turning to a recent instance of election interference, we confront our model with the 2016 U.S. presidential election in which Russia conducted interference operations [6] . After fitting a Bayesian structural time series model to election polls and social media posts associated with Russian Internet Research Agency internet trolls, We show that our model, though simple, is able to adequately capture many of the observed and inferred parameters' dynamics. We close by proposing some theoretical and empirical extensions to our work.
II. THEORY A. Election interference model
We consider the case of a simple election between two candidates in a homogeneous environment (e.g., no institutions such as an Electoral College) so that the election process at any time t ∈ [0, T ], a noisy representation of which is a public poll, can be represented by a scalar Z t ∈ [0, 1]. The actual result of the election is Z T . We hypothesize that the election dynamics take place in a latent space, where dynamics are represented by X t ∈ R. Without loss of generality, we will set x < 0 to be values of the latent poll that favor candidate A and x > 0 that favor candidate B. The latent and observable space are related by Z t = φ(X t ), where φ is a smooth sigmoidal function. We will choose φ(x) = 1 1+e −x . The election takes place in a population of N voting agents, each of whom updates their preferences over the candidates in the latent space at each time step t n by a small random variable ξ n,tn . These random variables satisfy E n [ξ n,t k ] = 0 for all t. The election process's increments are the sample mean of the realizations of the voting agents' preferences at time t. In the absence of interference, the stochastic election model is thus very simplean unbiased random walk, which we write as
where ∆t = t k+1 − t k . We display sample realizations of this process for different distributions of ξ n,t k in Fig 
Though simple, the random walk latent space election model is a unified approximation to varied population candidate preference updates. The latent election process evolves according to X k+1 = X k + 1 N 1≤n≤N ξ n,k , where ξ n,k is voting agent n's shift toward the left (< 0) or right (> 0) of the political spectrum at time k. In the center panel, the solid curve is a draw from the latent election process resulting from the preference updates ξn,t ∼ B 0.1
, where B(α, β) is the Beta distribution and we have set T = 365. This change in political preference shift distribution describes an electorate with increasing resistance to change in their political viewpoints. We display the preference shift distributions at t = 0 (t = T ) in Panel A (Panel B). For contrast, the dashed curve is a draw from the latent election process resulting from ξn,t ∼ B 1.5
, which describes an electorate for which political viewpoints are in increasing flux. We show the corresponding preference shift distributions at t = 0 (t = T ) in Panel D (Panel E). Despite these preference updates that are, in some sense, opposites of each other, the latent processes Xt are statistically effectively identical and are both well-modeled by the continuum approximation dXt = σdWt.
of hardening of political preferences and another characterizes preferences that are in increasing flux, the sample paths of X t k are statistically effectively identical since 1 N n ξ n,t k does not vary much between the distributions. When N is large we can reasonably approximate this process by the Wiener process, dX t = σdW t , where σ 
Var
1 N 1≤n≤N ξ n,t . We denote the control policies of Red and Blue-the functions by which Red and Blue attempt to influence (or prevent influence on) the election-by u R (t) and u B (t). These control policies are abstract variables in the context of our model but can be interpreted as monetary expenditures on interference operations.
We will assume that Red and Blue can affect the mean trajectory of the election but not its volatility (variance of its increments). We make this assumption because X t is an approximation to the process described by Eq. 1 and, as displayed in Fig. 1 and described above, this process's statistical characteristics do not change much even when the voting population's underlying preference change distributions are significantly different. Thus, under the influence of Red's and Blue's control policies, the election dynamics become
To first order expansion we have
, so the state equation becomes
since we have assumed a priori zero drift and can absorb constants into the definition of the control policies. We will use Eq. 3 as the state equation for the remainder of the paper.
B. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Red and Blue each seek to minimize separate scalar cost functionals of their own control policy and the other agent's control policy; for now, we will assume that the agents do not incur a running cost from the value of the state variable. The cost functionals can thus be written
The functions C R and C B represent the running cost or benefit of conducting election interference operations. With the assumption that it is equally costly to conduct operations that favor candidate A or candidate B and the additional requirement that the cost functions be smooth, we take the cost functions to be
for i ∈ {R, B}. The non-negative scalar λ i parameterizes the utility gained by player i from observing player ¬i's effort; if λ i is high, player i gains utility from player ¬i's expending resources, while if λ i = 0, player i has no regard for ¬i's level of effort but only for their own running cost and the final cost.
Though the running cost functions are equivalent across players in form, the final conditions differ between Red and Blue because of their qualitatively distinct objectives. Since Red wants to influence the outcome of the election in Blue's country in favor of candidate A, their final cost function Φ R must satisfy Φ R (x) < Φ R (y) for all x < 0 and y > 0; it seems reasonable to further assume that Φ R is monotonically non-decreasing everywhere. A straightforward approximation is to assume Φ R (x) = c 0 + c 1 x + O(x 2 ) ∼ cx, since the constant does not affect the relative dynamics. However, this allows the somewhat unrealistic limiting condition of infinite benefit (cost) if candidate A (B) gets 100% of the vote in the election. We will thus also consider two final conditions with bounded extremal cost: one smooth, Φ R (x) ∝ tanh(x); and one discontinuous, 
Alternatively, Blue may accept the result of the election as long as it does not stray "too far" from the initial expected value; we have a discontinuous final condition
, where ∆ is Blue's accepted margin of error. A nondenumerable panolopy of other final conditions can be hypothesized, but these capture the range of possible payoff structures.
The application of the dynamic programming principle [7, 8] to Eqs. 3, 4, and 5 leads to a system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for the value functions of Red and Blue,
and
The dynamic programming principle does not result in an Isaccs equation because the game is not zero-sum and the cost functionals for Red and Blue can have different functional forms. Performing the minimization with respect to the control variables gives the Nash equilibrium control policies,
and the exact functional form of Eqs. 7 and 8,
When solved over the entirety of state space, solutions to Eqs. 11 and 12 constitute the strategies of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium because, no matter the action taken by player ¬i at time t, player i is able to respond with the optimal action at time t + dt. Given the solution pair V R (x, t) and V B (x, t), the dis-
T can be written analytically. Substitution of Eqs. 9 and 10 into Eq. 3 gives
We discretize the state equation to obtain
with w n ∼ N (0, 1) and where we have put V in ≡ V i (x n , t n ). Thus the distribution of an increment of the latent electoral process is
(14) Now, using the Markov property of X t , we have
where
Taking N → ∞ as N ∆t = T remains constant gives a standard Gaussian path integral with an action S(x(t)) that incorporates the derivatives of the value functions.
Since u R and u B are just time-dependent functions of x(t), their distributions can also be found explicitly using the probability distribution Eq. 16 and the appropriate (time-dependent) Jacobian transformation. Unfortunately, these analytical results are of limited utility because we are unaware of analytical solutions to the system given in Eqs. 11 and 12, and hence V R (x, t) and V B (x, t) must be approximated. However, we will have something to say about analytical solutions presently in the case that player i announces a credible commitment to a particular control path.
In the general case presented above, we find the value functions V R (x, t) and V B (x, t) numerically through backward iteration, enforcing a Neumann boundary condition at a large but finite value of the latent state variable. Fig.  2 displays example realizations of the value functions for different λ i and final conditions. The value functions display diffusive behavior in common due to the game's stochasticity, but also differ qualitatively depending on the effect of the final condition propagating backward in time. When the final conditions are discontinuous, as is the case in the top panels of Fig. 2 , the derivatives of the value function assume greater magnitudes and vary more rapidly throughout the game than do the derivatives of the value function when the final conditions are continuous; this is a typical feature of solutions to equations of HJB-type [9] and has consequences for the game-theoretic interpretation of these results, as we discuss below. Fig. 2 also demonstrates that the extrema of the value functions are not as large in absolute magnitude when λ R = λ B = 0 as when λ R = λ B = 2; this is because higher values of λ i mean that player i derives utility not only from the final outcome of the game but also from causing player ¬i to expend resources in the game.
Eqs. 7 and 8 give the closed-loop control policies u R and u B respectively given the current state X t and time t. We display samples of u R , u B , and the electoral process Z t in Fig. 3 to illuminate some of the qualitative properties of this game before considering a more comprehensive sweep over parameters. We simulate the game with parameters
We plot the control policies in the top panel including the mean control policies E[u R ] and E[u B ], displayed in thicker curves. For this parameter set, it is optimal for Red to begin play with a relatively large amount of interference and, in the mean, decrease the level of interference over time. Conversely, throughout the game Blue increases their resistance to Red's interference. Despite this resistance, the bottom panel reveals that, for this parameter set, Red is able to accomplish their objective of causing candidate A to win: in the mean case, candidate A enjoys a comfortable lead in the election poll by the final time.
To gain a better idea of the qualitative nature of this game for a more varied set of parameters, we conduct a coarse parameter sweep over λ R , λ B , Φ R , and Φ B . Fig. 4 displays the results of this parameter sweep. We plot Red and Blue Nash equilibrum strategies for each of a set of 81 (= 3 4 ) discrete parameter combinations: λ R , λ B ∈ {0, 1, 2},
For each combination, we generated 1000 trials of the election process and averaged the resulting strategies to generate estimates of the mean strategy profile, shown as thick red and blue curves. Higher values of the coupling parameters λ i cause greater mean magnitude in control policies. Certain combinations of parameters lead to an "armsrace" effect in both playeres' control policies, wherein the Nash equilibrium strategies entail superexponential growth in the control policies near the end of the game. This occurs when at least one player has a discontinuous final condition. To the extent that this model reflects reality, this points to a general statement about election interference operations: An all-or-nothing mindset by either Red or Blue regarding the final outcome of the election leads to an arms race that negatively affects both players. This is a general feature of any situation to which the model described by Eqs. 3-5 applies. 
C. Credible commitment
If player ¬i credibly commits to playing a particular strategy v(t) on all of [0, T ], then the difficult problem of player i's finding a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile becomes a slightly easier problem of optimal control. Player i now seeks to find the policy u(t) that minimizes the functional
subject to the modified state equation
Following the logic of Eqs. 7 and 9, player i's value function is now given by the solution to the considerablysimpler HJB equation
(20) Though nonlinear, this HJB equation can be linearized through a change of variables and subsequently be formally solved through path integral methods [10] . Setting V (x, t) = −η log ϕ(x, t), substituting in Eq. 20, and performing the differentiation, we are able to remove the nonlinearity iff For this parameter set, Blue is fighting a losing battle-the bottom panel clearly shows that, even with Blue attempting to stop Red from interfering in the game, optimal play by both players results in a significantly lower E[Zt] than for the electoral process without any interference. η = 2σ 2 . Eq. 20 becomes a backward Kolmogorov equation with time-dependent drift and sink term,
Application of the Feynman-Kac formula gives the solution to Eq. 21 as [11] ϕ(x, t) = exp − λ 2σ 2
where Y t is defined by
Using this formalism, path integral control can be applied to estimate the value function for arbitrary v(t). Fig. 5 displays path integral solutions to Eq. 20 when player ¬i credibly commits to playing v(t) = t 2 for the duration of the game and player i's final cost function takes the form
. In the further restricted case where there is a credible commitment by one party to play v(t) = v, a constant control policy, we can say more about the nature of solutions. We will also show presently why this constraint is actually not all that restrictive. Under this assumption, the probability law corresponding with Eq. 23 is given by
so that the (exponentially-transformed) value function reads
(25) This integral can be evaluated exactly for many Φ(y) and can always be approximated using the method of Laplace. If σ is small, Laplace's approximation to the integral reads
so that, inverting the transformation above, the value function can be approximated by
and the control policy by
Fig . 6 displays the results of approximating the value function with Eq. 26 at t = 0, along with the true (numerically-determined) value function at both t = 0 and t = T . Even with these seemingly-restrictive assumptions, this theory can be used to provide a modelagnostic method for value function approximation in a noncooperative scenario. For arbitrary v(t), expansion about t + ∆t gives v(t + ∆t) = v(t) + v (t)∆t, leading to an approximate value function iteration over a small time increment ∆t,
t)+Φ(x+(T −t)[v(t)+v (t)∆t]). (28)
FIG. 4. The universe of possible strategies varies qualitatively based on the coupling parameters λR and λB and the final conditions ΦR and ΦB. We obtain the value functions VR and VB through numerical solution of Eqs. 11 and 12, and then calculate the realized Nash equilibrium strategies uR and uB for 1000 simulations of the election process. We then average these simulations and plot them in thick red and blue curves, representing E[uR(t)] and E[uB(t)] respectively. Along with these mean strategies, we plot two arbitrary realizations of uR and uB in thinner red and blue curves. For parameter combinations leading to large fluctuations near the final time, we display the final 10% of the curves in inset plots with a linear-log scaled vertical axis and log scaled horizontal axis.
In application, both of v(t) and v (t) can be estimated from possibly-noisy data on t ∈ [0, t] and used in this approximation.
III. APPLICATION
A recent notable example of election interference operations is that of the Russian military foreign intelligence service (GRU)'s and Internet Research Agency (IRA)'s operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election contest to attempt to harm one candidate's chances of winning (Hilary Clinton) and aid another candidate (Donald Trump) [6] . Though Russian foreign intelligence had conducted election interference operations in the past at least once before, in the Ukrainian elections of 2014 [12] , the 2015-16 operations were notable in that IRA operatives used the microblogging website Twitter in an attempt to influence the election outcome. When this attack vector was discovered, Twitter accounts associated with IRA activity were shut down and all data associated with those accounts was collected and analyzed [13, 14] . However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there exists no publicly-available effort to reverseengineer the exact qualitative nature of the control vectors used by the the IRA-Red team-and by U.S. domestic and foreign intelligence agencies-Blue team. In an effort to perform data-driven simulation of RedBlue dynamics, we fit a form of the model described in Sec. II A and compare it to qualitative theoretical predictions, finding the free parameters in the model that best describe the observed data and inferred latent controls.
Since the U.S. presidential election system is of nontrivial complexity, owing both to the number of minor party candidates that also compete and also to the unique Electoral College system, we make the simplifying assumptions stated in Sec. I-namely, that only two candidates contest the election and that the election process is modeled by a simple "candidate A versus candidate B" poll. We can observe neither the Red u R (t) nor Blue u B (t) control policies, but are able to observe a proxy for u R , namely, the number of tweets sent by IRA-associated accounts in the year leading up to the 2016 election [15] . This dataset contains a total of 2,973,371 tweets from 2,848 unique Twitter handles. Of these tweets, a total of 1,107,361 occurred in the year immediately preceding the election (08/11/2015 -08/11/2016). We grouped these tweets by day and used the time series N tweets (t) = total number of tweets on day t as an observable from which u R could be inferred. This time series was subsequently normalized to have (intertemporal) zero mean and unit variance for ease in inference. We used the RealClearPolitics poll aggregation as a proxy for the electoral process itself [16] , averaging polls that occurred at the same timestamp and using the earliest date in the date range of the poll if it was conducted over multiple days as the timestamp of that observation.
With these two observables, we fit a Bayesian structural time series model of the form presented in Fig. 7 , written as
We have written X for the election process in latent space and e for the observed election poll results on [0, 1]. We fit the model of Eq. 29 using the No-U-Turn Sampler algorithm [17] , sampling 2000 draws from the model's distribution from each of two independent Markov chains, not including 1000 draws per chain of burn-in. The sampler appeared to converge well based on graphical consideration of draws from the posterior predictive distribution of N tweets, norm and e, and because Gelman-Rubin statistics for all variables had mean value E[R] < 1.01 except for that of σ (E[R σ ] = 1.0865). Fig. 8 displays draws from the latent distributions of u R and u B , along with draws from the posterior predictive distributions of e and N tweets, norm overlaid with the respective observed series. Latent control policies display a roughly-convex shape, with higher values in the beginning of the time under study, a steady decrease toward the middle of time, and a more rapid increase toward larger values near t = 1.
To gain qualitative insight from the theoretical model proposed above, we need to find the parameter values θ = (λ R , λ B , σ, Φ R , Φ B ) that best explain the observed data and latent control vectors fit using the model of Eq. 29. We use Legendre polynomials to approximate the functions Φ R and Φ B , setting Φ i (x) K k=0 a ik P k (x), so that the actual parameter vector considered is θ = (λ R , λ B , σ, a 0,r , ..., a K,r , a 0,b , ..., a K,b ). Bayes's theorem states that
where M is the model presented above, and Z is the collection of observed data and unobservable inferred latent variables, Z = (X, u R , u B ). Though Eq. 16 and subsequent application of time-dependent Jacobian transformations gives us an analytical method of determining the distributions of X, u R , and u B , and hence a method for determining p(θ|Z, M ), in practice this result is not much help since we still must numerically solve the PDEs Eqs. 11 and 12 in order to estimate V R and V B , as well as numerically estimate the appropriate Jacobians.
To avoid at least the numerical Jacobian estimation, we approximate the likelihood function using a nonparametric kernel-based method with kernel function K, so that
The values Z n |θ are draws from the distribution of (X t , u R (t), u B (t)) generated by the analytical model given a particular value of θ. A maximum a posteriori estimate of θ is then given by
We will not state any a priori beliefs over θ and so set p(θ|M ) ∝ 1, so that an MAP estimate of θ can be found through maximization of N n=1 K(Z − Z n |θ). We set K(x) to be a Gaussian kernel and maximize a stochastic estimation of log 10 N n=1 K(Z − Z n |θ) using N = 500 draws from the distribution of paths corresponding with the value functions given by solutions of the system of HJB equations. This maximization was performed using the differential evolution algorithm [18] . 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We introduce, analyze, and numerically solve (analytically solve in simplified cases) a simple, first-principles model of noncooperative strategic interference by a foreign intelligence service from one country (Red) in an election occurring in another country (Blue) and attempts by Blue's domestic intelligence service to counter this interference. Though simple, our model is able to provide qualitative insight into the dynamics of 9 . Using a kernel-based approximation to the functional density p(Z|θ, M ), we used the differential evolution algorithm to compute a maximum a posteriori estimate of the parameter vector θ. Panel A displays draws of uR and uB from the distribution p(Z|θ * , M ) in thin curves, along with the inferred values of uR and uB from the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The model describes the data well except near the beginning and end of the time period under study, in which dynamics other than those modeled appear to be predominant. Panel C displays draws of X from p(Z|θ * , M ), which also appear to describe the data well. Panel B shows the MAP estimates for ΦR (red curve) and ΦB (blue curve).
such strategic interactions and performs well when fitted to polling and social media data surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election contest. We find that all-ornothing attitudes regarding the outcome of the election interference (whether or not it was successful) with no gradation of utility, even if these attitudes are held by only one player, result in an arms race of spending on interference and counter-interference operations by both players. We then find analytical solutions to player i's optimal control problem in the case where player ¬i credibly commits to a strategy v(t) and detail an analytical value function approximation that can be used by player i even when player ¬i does not commit to a particular strategy as long as player ¬i's current strategy and its derivative can be estimated. We demonstrate the applicability of our model to real election interference scenarios by analyzing the Russian effort to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election through observation of Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) troll posts on the website Twitter. Using this data, along with aggregate presidential election polling data, we infer the time series of Russian and U.S. control policies and find parameters of our model that best explain these inferred (latent) control policies. We show that, for most of the time under consideration, our model provides a good explanation for the inferred variables.
There are several areas in which our work could be improved. From a theoretical point of view, our model is one of the simplest that can be proposed to model this situation. While from an a priori point of view it is derived from first principles and makes a minimum of assumption about the election mechanics, electorate, and cost (equivalently, utility) functions of the respective intelligence agencies and hence is justafiable on the grounds of parsimony and acceptable empirical performance (on at least one election contest), the lack of assumptions that we make is rather unrealistic. Though a pure random walk model for am election is not without serious precedent [19] , a prudent extension of this work could incorporate non-interference-related state dynamics as a generalization of Eq. 3, e.g., as dx = [µ 0 + µ 1 x + u R (t) + u B (t)]dt + σdW.
This state equation can account for simple drift in the election results as a candidate endogenously becomes more or less popular or capture possible mean-reverting behavior in a hotly-contested race. Another interesting extension would allow for state-dependent running costs, particularly in the running cost of the Red player. Though the action of election interference is nominally intended to cause a particular candidate to win or lose, there are often other goals as well, such as undermining the Blue citizens' trust in their electoral process. Thus, Red might gain utility even just from having a particular candidate pull ahead in polls multiple times when that candidate would not have otherwise done so, even if the candidate does not actually win the election. In the context of our model, this can be represented by setting Red's cost functional to be
Both of these modifications are relatively easy to incorporate into the model, as demonstrated, and will not qualitatively change the nature of the value functions V R and V B since their effects will simply be to introduce an additional drift term (Eq. 32) or a continuous, nondifferentiable source term (Eq. 33). A more fundamental qualitative change would be to expand the scope of Red's interference to alter the latent volatility of the election process. For example, the objective of Red's interference operations might be not only to change the drift of the state equation to make it more likely for candidate A to win, but also to increase the uncertainty associated with the election's polling.
In addition to theoretical modifications, other work could simply extend the present results to other elections. The principal difficulty with this approach lies in the inherent difficulty of finding any data at all with which to work. As we note in Sec. III, we are able to confront our model to data only because the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was so well-publicized, and even so we found it necessary to infer the variables in which we were actually interested. Other than this event, we were unable to find any publicly-available data for any other election interference episode that is in the public domain.
